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SOME ANTITRUST ISSUES RAISED BY LARGE
ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS
Jules Bernard*
With the advent of electronic funds transfer (EFT) systems, a number of
important antitrust questions have been raised, particularly when these sys-
tems are sponsored by the largest and most powerful institutions in a market.
In examining the antitrust issues involved in any EFT system, one must con-
sider the concentration of resources that such EFT projects represent and the
possible effects of this concentration on other potential EFT system competi-
tors, the restraints that the EFT projects might impose on competition among
the participants within such a project, and, finally, the efforts of regulatory
bodies, especially state legislatures, to deal with the adverse social and eco-
nomic effects that EFT threatens to produce.
It is impossible to do more than sketch a few of these issues in a single
article. Nevertheless, there are questions raised by large EFT projects that
are particularly prominent and that require consideration while EFT is still
developing and while its course can be shaped to conform to the antitrust
laws without inflicting excessive hardship.
I. ANTITRUST PROBLEMS
A. Entry
The first major question raised by any large EFT joint venture is whether
the size of the joint venture itself effectively removes the chance for compet-
ing EFT systems to develop.' The present doctrine in this area is expressed
* Private Practitioner, Zimmer, Egge and Sisk, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1966, Yale
University; J.D., 1971, University of Pennsylvania. The views contained herein are
purely those of the author and do not represent those of any client.
1. This question is especially important in the context of federally operated large
EFT systems. See Comments of the United States Department of Justice, In the Matter
of Proposed Policy on Access to Federal Reserve Clearing and Settlement Facilities,
Nov. 20, 1975; Comments of the United States Department of Justice on the Fed-
eral Reserve Board's Proposed Amendment of Regulation J and Related Issues, filed May
14, 1974; letter from Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice, to Garth Marston, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
Oct. 16, 1975 (on file at Antitrust Division, Department of Justice). See also Computer
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in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. 2 The Penn-Olin Chemical Co.
was a joint subsidiary formed by Pennsalt Chemical Co. and Olin-Mathieson
Chemical Co. to produce sodium chlorate for the southeastern United States.
Pennsalt already had entered the sodium chlorate industry, but its only plant
was in Oregon. Olin-Mathieson was not engaged in the manufacture of so-
dium chlorate. Only two other companies produced sodium chlorate in the
Southeast, but some, including Olin-Mathieson, produced a wide variety of
related chemicals, and stood ready to enter the field.
The Department of Justice challenged the venture3 under section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 4 and argued that, but for the joint venture, both companies
would have entered the attractive southeastern market and would have com-
peted against each other. The companies maintained that neither one would
have entered the market by itself and that the joint venture actually increased
competition by adding a competitor to the market. Although the district
court held for the defendants, its decision was based upon a different ration-
ale. The court ruled that either company might have entered the market
independently, but that after one company had done so, there would not be
sufficient business to induce the other company to enter. The court observed
that the joint venture supplied a new competitor in the southeastern market
and did not preclude future entry any more than if either of the companies
had independently entered the market. Therefore, there was no restraint on
competition.5
The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the case to the district court.
The Court found that the district court had failed to consider what effect the
second company might have exerted on the southeast market merely by
threatening to enter it.6 Comparing the actual effect of the Penn-Olin joint
venture to a merger, the majority believed that competition had been elimi-
Services Inquiry, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970), aff'd & rev'd in part, GTE Serv. Corp. v.
FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. 378 U.S. 158 (1964). See generally Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust
Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HAlv. L. REv. 1007
(1969).
3. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
5. 217 F. Supp. at 132-34.
6. 378 U.S. at 173-74. The court concluded that:
The existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed corporation
engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter




nated between Pennsalt and Olin-Mathieson in the sodium chloride market.7
The Court stressed the possible beneficial effect on competition of a strong
potential competitor "waiting in the wings."
Penn-Olin is especially significant in evaluating the acceptability of large
EFT joint ventures because it focuses attention on the question of whether
less comprehensive groups of institutions, or indeed single institutions, could
provide EFT services in competition with one another. If so, competition
at the systems level would generate faster, safer, cheaper and more flexible
EFT services. Consumers and merchants could help to shape the growth of
many systems, forcing them to adapt to the shifting and disparate needs of
different users.
Those who build the large EFT ventures often argue to the contrary that
their costs are so great and the value of individual transactions that can be
diverted from traditional systems to their EFT system is so small, that uni-
versal participation in the project is essential for it to be economical. This
argument deserves scrutiny on several issues. 'First, the market area that the
ventures identify may not be the appropriate region to be considered. An
unduly small market, such as a single city or even a single state, may indeed
prove to have too few EFT-divertible transactions. It is possible, however,
that larger regions composed of several states could support several discrete
systems, each of which has part of the market in its component area. Sec-
ond, the projected costs upon which those in the joint venture rely may reflect
expensive, obsolescent technology or an overly ambitious project. They also
may reflect too narrow a focus on EFT transactions alone when the system
could easily be adapted to perform other tasks such as inventory control and
automated teller functions. Finally, the argument may ignore the extent to
which innovation in communications and computer technology can reduce
costs.
Large EFT ventures also deserve scrutiny because they constitute vertical
integrations into a new industry, that of computerized financial communica-
tions systems, by nearly all the potential users of those systems. Although
independent companies, such as those which already offer computerized com-
munications for nonfinancial information, may stand ready to enter the field,
those in the EFT system can cut them off from their market by dealing ex-
clusively within the joint venture. 10 The independent companies, however,
7. id.
8. Id.
9. See Baxter, Cootner & Scott, The Law and Economies of Electronic Funds Trans-
fer Systems-Executive Summary (1976) (on file at Department of Justice).
10. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968); cf.
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might enjoy several advantages over the EFT system. It is conceivable that,
given the opportunity, they might be able to produce EFT services more
cheaply and more efficiently than the financial institutions, spread their fixed
costs over a larger number of services, including nonfinancial data communi-
cations services, handle a greater volume of items at a lower cost per item,
adapt more easily to advancing technology and develop new techniques for
using existing technology more productively, and provide specialized services
that would not be profitable for financial institutions to offer. Finally, the
independent companies may be able to combine EFT services with nonfinan-
cial communications services to generate entirely new capabilities, such as the
transmission of the entire range of information required in connection with
intermodal transportation. Indeed, hybrid (financial and nonfinancial)
communications systems for intercorporate dealings may some day dwarf the
purely retail EFT systems both in the number of items transmitted and in
total dollar volume.
B. Access
Assuming that a single system composed of all the major institutions turns
out to be necessary to provide EFT services in a market, it is the settled rule
that other competing institutions must be able to use the system's facilities
to serve their own customers, either by gaining membership in the venture
or by paying a reasonable fee for access. The major alternative to open ac-
cess is dissolution of the venture. In United States v. Terminal Railroad As-
sociation," the Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of access to
services. The Court noted that the Terminal Railroad Association, an associ-
ation attempting to monopolize all train access routes across the Missouri
River to St. Louis, was not merely an association that facilitated commerce,
but rather one that conferred tremendous competitive advantages on the
member railroads. Realizing that the participants had not hesitated to use
this advantage against their rivals, the Court ruled that the practices of the
association clearly violated the basic tenets of freedom of competition. 12
While such a combination might be lawful in some instances, the Court main-
tained that because of the "physical and topographical condition peculiar to
the [St. Louis] locality," the existing system was restricting interstate com-
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States Steel Corp. v.
FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey),
253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966).
11. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
12. Id. at 401.
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merce and that a unified system would be justified only if an impartial agent
of all those railroads which used the system operated it.'3
The Terminal Railroad Association and its members had not been content
to rest on the superiority that geography gave them. They had executed a
number of agreements to choke off competition before it began. Each member
railroad enjoyed the power to veto the admission of any newcomer to the ven-
ture, and only those who belonged to the venture were allowed to use its
facilities. Furthermore, the proprietary companies, who owned nearly one-
third of the existing railroad mileage, had effectively eliminated any future
possibility of competition by obligating themselves to the use of the Associa-
tion's facilities forever. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court had no
trouble finding that this "exclusive ownership and control" of all of the bridg-
es by less than all of the railroads required to use them was a violation of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act "in that it constitutes a contract or com-
bination in restraint of commerce among the States and an attempt to monop-
olize commerce among the States which must pass through the gateway at St.
Louis."'1 4 Despite this finding, the Court declined to dissolve the combina-
tion between the Terminal Company, the Merchant's Bridge, and the Wig-
gens Ferry, believing that it was perfectly possible for an organization like
the Association to provide a valuable service to the community. It perceived
the evil deriving from the Terminal Company's operations as the "grip" that
the proprietary companies had on commerce coming into St. Louis. If this
dominance could be abolished, the Association would be beneficial to the
commerce of the city as a "proper terminal association acting as an impartial
agent of every line which [was] under compulsion to use its facilities."'15 The
Court, therefore, directed the parties to admit competing railroads into full
ownership and control of the terminal properties upon reasonable and nondis-
criminatory terms, and to offer access to the properties at reasonable fees to
railroads that preferred not to participate in ownership. It also required
them to eliminate the provisions that required the participants to use the
Terminal Company's facilities exclusively. In addition, the Court forbade
the defendants from engaging in a number of particular discriminatory prac-
tices. 1
The principle of nondiscriminatory access set forth in Terminal Railroad
Association has proved to be durable. It has been adopted in such diverse
13. Id. at 405. Physical conditions made it impossible to reach St. Louis without
using facilities entirely controlled by the three terminal systems in the Association. Or-
iginally, these systems operated independently and competed with each other, but ulti-
mately, they were absorbed into the Association. Id. at 397-99.
14. Id. at 409.
15. Id. at 410.
16. Id. at 411-12.
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areas as news-gathering services,' 7 produce markets,' stock exchanges,' 9 and
electric power companies. 20
Monopolistic EFT ventures can produce many undesirable side effects.
For one thing, the member institutions can use their power over the EFT
system to compel customers to use other services they offer (such as other
EFT services) 21 or to compel their customers to refrain from dealing with
nonparticipants. 22  In addition, EFT systems can lead to more extensive co-
ordination among those within the system than is necessary to fulfill the pur-
poses of the joint venture. Excessive coordination can show up in uniform
pricing, either in the actual prices or in the methods of calculating them, in
market allocation, in product division, or in standardization of services.
Uniform pricing, market allocation, and product division are relatively
straightforward abuses of a joint venture. 23  Standardization, however, rep-
resents a more subtle attack on the consumer. Standardization not only de-
feats customers' power to exercise their preference, but also forces customers
to contribute to the fixed costs of services that they do not use. Furthermore,
it often means that the rate of change and especially the rate of adopting
new technology, tends to proceed at the pace that the least adventurous insti-
tution sets. This danger is greatest where the highest degree of innovation
is called for, that is, in research and development. The industry-wide ven-
ture eliminates the risk of inadequate innovation by guaranteeing that all will
have to consent to the adoption of new technology, and that all will be certain
to benefit from whatever technology is adopted. 24
Large EFT ventures also raise the spectre of discrimination among the
joint venturers. It is all too possible for the largest, most dominant members
of the venture to try to compel the others to use their system exclusively,
for example, by structuring fees in a certain way. 25 They may also influence
17. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The district court relied
on Terminal Railroad Association in prescribing the appropriate form of relief. The
Supreme Court, while rejecting the lower court's argument, nevertheless accepted the
court's choice of methods for dissipating the anticompetitive effects of the organization.
Id. at 21-22. See pp. 756-58 infra.
18. See, e.g., Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484
(lst Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
19. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
20. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
21. Cf. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
22. Cf. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
23. Cf. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 398 U.S. 350 (1967) (market allocation); Amer-
ican Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1967) (uniform pricing).
24. See United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. 87,456 (C.D.
Cal. 1969).
25. Cf. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Advance Busi-
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the standards that the association actually does adopt in a fashion that serves
their own ends, and not necessarily those of their smaller partners by insisting
on higher-cost technologies than smaller institutions would care to adopt, on
different service areas than those which the smaller institutions would prefer,
or on different service lines or packages from those that meet the special
needs of the smaller institutions' customers. All of these distortions require
the smaller institutions, and their customers, to help pay for something they
may not need.
The question of access is particularly important in the field of EFT, be-
cause it is beginning to appear likely that an institution offering EFT services
may enjoy a significant advantage over one that does not. There are several
areas where the issue of access has already stirred debate. One area that
has attracted a great deal of attention is whether thrift institutions deserve
direct access to automated clearing facilities, rather than indirect access
through a commercial bank, and under what conditions they can demand ac-
cess. These questions depend on the specific circumstances that excluded
thrift institutions confront, whether the denial injures them significantly, or
whether they can mitigate or erase the injury in a reasonable fashion. If
direct access to an automated clearing house does confer a significant com-
petitive advantage and the excluded institutions have no reasonable way to
create their own alternative facilities, then those excluded must be admitted
to the automated clearing house on an equal basis with those who already
belong. As a matter of federal policy, the same sort of examination should
be undertaken whether the facilities are privately operated or operated by
a government agency. The economic effects of access, not the form of own-
ership, should control the analysis. Similarly, if it should turn out that retail
point-of-sale EFT systems confer a substantial advantage on those who have
access to them, and they cannot be duplicated by excluded institutions, then
the antitrust laws will compel access to them as well.
It is important that monopolistic EFT systems be confined to the area
where their monopoly is justified and not be allowed to spill over into areas
where competition can exist. Because point-of-sale EFT systems differ
markedly from automated clearing houses in purpose, operation and com-
petitive effect, and because the economic foundations for point-of-sale serv-
ices depend on different elements from those that sustain automated clearing
house services, point-of-sale systems may be governed by one set of antitrust
principles while automated clearing houses are governed by another.
ness Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 920 (1970).
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C. Discriminatory Practices
Even where a large EFT system does not enjoy a monopoly of the kind
that brings into play the doctrine of Terminal Railroad Association, that is,
where it does not control an essential facility, it may nevertheless inflict injury
upon the public. On the surface, the issues raised by such a system may
seem very similar to those raised by monopolies controlling essential facilities.
They rest on a different philosophical ground, however, and they can produce
very different results. This philosophical ground is laid out in Associated
Press v. United States.26 In Associated Press the Department of Justice chal-
lenged several by-laws of the Associated Press (AP) as restraining the dis-
semination of news. These by-laws gave a member of the association the
power to impose a heavy burden upon an applicant for membership when
that applicant competed against the member. Applicants who did not com-
pete against members did not face the same difficulties. Certain other by-
laws forbade members to provide their "spontaneous news," that is, news re-
ports that they generated, to anyone other than AP or its members. At the
same time, the by-laws commanded AP to furnish news only to members.
The total effect of these by-laws was to prevent competitors of AP members
from either joining AP or obtaining access to its news by any other method.
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the district court, enjoined AP from en-
forcing the discriminatory entry requirements and the ban on disseminating
"spontaneous news" to nonmembers. 27 He refused to declare the ban on dis-
semination to be illegal in and of itself, but he found it to be part of an over-
all illegal plan. To eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the combination,
he decreed that A P would have to open its membership to all applicants on
a nondiscriminatory basis and eliminate the restrictions on dissemination of
news. The Supreme Court sustained the decree of the lower court in all
particulars. 28
Judge Hand's opinion differs considerably from that of the Supreme Court.
He approached the issues in a fairly traditional manner, declaring that the
Associated Press enjoyed many of the attributes of a monopoly, and conclud-
ing that it was impressed with a public duty to treat all applicants for mem-
bership on a nondiscriminatory basis. He condemned the other restrictions
on disseminating news only because they were imposed by a monopolist.29
26. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
27. 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
28. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
29. 52 F. Supp. at 374. Analogizing this situation to the situation in Terminal Rail-
road Association, Judge Hand felt obligated to dispose of the good with the bad stating:
Nevertheless, in all such cases the power must not be incident to a combina-
[Vol. 25:749
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Citing Terminal Railroad Association and United States v. Great Lakes Tow-
ing Co.,s0 Judge Hand explicitly rooted his opinion in the "essential facility"
doctrine. 81
The Supreme Court rejected this segmented approach and treated the en-
tire group of by-laws as a seamless fabric whose overall effect constituted a
restraint of trade. The Court believed that the restraint would come about,
not because AP controlled an essential facility, but simply because it pos-
sessed enough market power to do so.
Relying on Judge Hand's assessment that AP was an organization of "great
consequence, '32 the Court ruled that there was a violation of the Sherman
Act because AP's power derived from a collective agreement, not from "in-
dividual enterprise and sagacity," and the result was to reduce the ability of
nonmembers to compete.3 3 The Supreme Court accepted Judge Hand's
proposed relief because it seemed reasonably calculated to erase the prohibi-
tion on news dissemination. The Court did not suggest that the proposed
relief was the only relief that would be appropriate; indeed, the Court was
willing to accept it only because Judge Hand would be able to monitor its
effectiveness. 34
The reasoning behind the decree is far broader than the decree itself. It
can be applied to many different types of anticompetitive activity. It is not
limited to those arbitrary exclusionary policies that EFT projects might adopt,
for instance, the arbitrary refusal to allow participation by thrift institu-
tions, but rather extends to all anticompetitive activity that derives its power
to injure from the sharing of resources by competitors. Associated Press can
tion which, though bound to admit all on equal terms, does not do so. While
the present by-laws as to admission are in force, these agreements are parts
of an unlawful combination, and they must be enjoined until the primary
wrong is remedied.
Id.
30. 208 F. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1913).
31. See pp. 752-55 supra.
32. 326 U.S. at 18, quoting 52 F. Supp. at 373. AP gathered news from around the
world and was the "chief single source of news for the American press." 326 U.S. at
18.
33. 326 U.S. at 15-16.
34. In adopting the existing decree, the Court stressed that:
The fashioning of a decree in an antitrust case in such a way as to prevent
future violations and eradicate existing evils is a matter which rests largely in
the discretion of the court.
Id. at 22. Later, in United States v. E.I. duPont De Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316
(1961), the Court qualified this statement by saying that the relief was "initially" the
province of the district court, but that the Supreme Court also had a duty "to be sure
that a decree is fashioned which will effectively redress proved violations of the antitrust
laws." Id. at 323.
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be used to attack projects that inhibit the competitive development of EFT
services over a single system, to attack arrangements that preclude the system
members from experimenting with alternative systems, and to attack ventures
that prevent other systems from coming into being. Associated Press is con-
cerned primarily with the source of power. Its discussion of how the power
is used limits the form of the relief, but not the principle on which the relief
is based.
Because so many EFT projects resemble the organization of AP, Associ-
ated Press has special significance in the area of EFT services. EFT
projects are composed of competitors and potential competitors. The
participants pool their power to acquire information (in AP, news; in
EFT, funds) and exchange it with one another for the use of all. The com-
petitive advantage that the joint venturers gain derives not from the power
to exchange alone, but from the quantity and distribution of the commodity
within their control. The information in question is of a kind whose free
flow is essential to the nation's welfare.
The relief granted in Associated Press is significant, not so much for its
breadth, but rather for its precision in addressing the anticompetitive effects
that AP produced. In contrast to the relief given in Terminal Railroad
Association, the relief in Associated Press does not direct AP to accept
all applicants as members; it merely requires AP to ignore the competitor
or noncompetitor status of an applicant. In other words, Associated Press
focused on discrimination, not monopolization, and the decree is framed to
eliminate the inequity.
The relief granted in Associated Press may well not go far enough to pro-
tect the public from the anticompetitive influences of large EFT systems. Un-
like AP members, those who deploy EFT systems compete not only in
the gathering and processing of information but also in the manner of dis-
tributing it, that is, in greater efficiencies and more rapid innovation at the
systems level. This form of competition cannot be preserved by compulsory
access. Indeed, compulsory access can result in the elimination of these as-
pects of competition by encouraging a monopolistic system to develop where
none would otherwise have arisen. Associated Press makes it clear that if
intersystem competition is a value to be protected, a remedy specifically de-
signed to achieve that end will have to be found.
II. THE Parker DOCTRINE AND STATE REGULATORY CONTROL OF EFTS
Many states have started to pass laws to control the growth of EFT. These
statutes fall into three major categories: "wild-card" statutes, under which
states commit themselves to follow the same policies as those the Comptroller
[Vol. 25: 749
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prescribes for national banks; expanded branching statutes, under which
states declare remote terminals to be branches, and regulate them accord-
ingly; and other, entirely new, patterns of regulation.
A common feature of some of these schemes is the "compulsory sharing"
provision. Using this provision states declare that financial institutions may
deploy EFT systems, but only if the institutions agree to make the systems
available to other institutions and their customers. The deploying institutions
may charge reasonable fees for their efforts. They may not discriminate be-
tween their own organization and the other institutions, however, nor may
they charge excessive fees. Some states say that all financial institutions which
deploy EFT systems must make them available to all other financial institu-
tions. Other states define categories of institutions (usually banks and sav-
ings and loan associations) and only require a system-deploying institution to
share with other institutions in the same category. These states generally al-
low sharing across category lines but do not compel it. Some EFT projects
in compulsory-sharing states include all or nearly all the available financial
institutions. The participants in these projects seem to believe that the state
laws shelter them from antitrust attack, at least with regard to questions of
access. This belief is likely to prove untenable.
The area where state regulatory provisions can grant immunity from fed-
eral antitrust laws was delineated in Parker v. Brown35 and in subsequent
cases that narrowly limited the doctrine expressed in that case. Parker dealt
with an elaborate regulatory plan adopted by the state of California to govern
the production and distribution of raisins. The plan created an Agricultural
Probate Advisory Commission to consider, review, and adopt agricultural
marketing programs. These programs were to be applied to certain regions,
called "zones," that the Commission was to define. The Supreme Court held
that the Sherman Act did not apply to the California plan because the plan
was that of a sovereign state, not that of the private producers. Congress'
purpose in passing the Sherman Act was limited to restraining the actions
of private parties and not state action.3 6 The Court pointed out that the pro-
gram was created by the state legislature, carried out by its agents, enforced
by its authority, in furtherance of its own goals. Noting this extensive
state involvement, the Court ruled that ":[t]he state . . . as sovereign, im-
35. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See generally First, Private Interest and Public Control:
Government Action, the First Amendment, and the Sherman Act, 1975 UTAH L. REV.
9; Kintner & Kaufman, The State Action Antitrust Immunity Defense, 23 AM. U.L.
REV. 527 (1974).
36. 317 U.S. at 351.
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posed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not
undertake to prohibit. '37
Lower courts have limited 'Parker in several ways. They have generally
been reluctant to find "state action" present unless the web of regulation
adopted by a state is specific enough to direct the activities of private parties.
The mere existence of an extensive regulatory scheme has not been enough
to invoke Parker where the state exercises only "general supervision rather
than . . .specific direction. 38 The state must be inextricably involved in
the conduct. As the Fifth Circuit noted in connection with rates filed by
the Georgia Power Co., in Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co.: 3 9
The Commission here gave lengthy consideration to each of the
practices and rates under attack, and after full adversary hearings
ordered them into effect, some with major modifications. Defend-
ants' conduct cannot be characterized as individual action when we
consider the state's intimate involvement with the rate-making
process. Though the rates and practices originated with the regu-
lated utility, Georgia Power, the facts make it plain that they
emerged from the Commission as products of the Commission.
They are thus immune from the operation of the antitrust laws un-
der the Parker exemption.
40
Other lower courts have limited Parker in other ways as well. In Woods
Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,41 the Fifth Cir-
37. Id. at 352, citing Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 334-35 (1904). In Olsen, a would-
be harbor pilot had challenged the Galveston Pilot Association as being a monopoly. The
Olsen Court rejected this challenge, saying: "It must follow that no monopoly or combi-
nation in a legal sense can arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the
state are alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon them by law." Id. at 345.
The Parker Court also cited Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (D.S.C. 1895), which
held that a monopoly of liquor sales by South Carolina could not be challenged under
the Sherman Act, because a state is not a "person" under the Sherman Act. Id. at 911.
The Supreme Court echoed the observation of the district court that "[tlhe state makes
no contract, enters into no combination or conspiracy. She declares and asserts in herself
the monopoly in the purchase and sale of liquors." Id.
38. Marnell v. United Parcel Serv., 260 F. Supp. 391, 409 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See also
Macom Prod. Corp. v. ATT, 359 F. Supp. 973 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (no immunity for
tariff merely because filed with state commission); United States v. Pacific Southwest
Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (merger approved by state commission
not exempt).
39. 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. Id. at 1140. It is noteworthy that the Fifth Circuit echoed the Parker Court in
pointing out that the regulatory body had the power to alter proposals that came before
it. Id. at 1139. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 3:52 (1943). See also Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
41. 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
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cuit Court of Appeals adopted the point of view that it was "incumbent upon
this court to render both state regulatory and federal antitrust goals comple-
mentary rather than mutually exclusive."'42 In Woods the defendants sought
to thwart the production of natural gas by the plaintiffs through the use of
a state regulatory commission that established quotas on gas production. Re-
lying on Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission,43 the ap-
peals court held that the goal of administrative regulation and the antitrust
laws was the same-the most efficient allocation of resources-and that Tex-
as' quota system for the production of natural gas did not bar an application
of the antitrust laws to defendants' concerted attempts to prevent plaintiffs
from extracting gas.44
One month after Woods was decided, it was cited by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.4" The
Hecht court concluded that Parker referred to a situation where the state law
was in harmony with a federal statute, the Agricultural Adjusting Act, that
itself was designed to contravene the application of antitrust laws in the
area. 46  Therefore, the court in Hecht believed that the state regulatory
scheme in Parker had complemented federal policy rather than conflicted
with it. The court also quoted with approval Whitten v. Paddock Pool Build-
ers, Inc.,47 where the First Circuit ruled that there is antitrust immunity" 'only
42. Id. at 1302.
43. 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
44. 438 F.2d at 1302, quoting Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Both these cases established that "the two forms
of economic regulation complement each other." 438 F.2d at 1303.
45. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
46. The appeals court's rationale effectively limited the Parker doctrine to the narrow
fact pattern of that case. The court said:
Since the Parker Court found the state regulation harmonious with the federal
agricultural regulatory scheme, the Supreme Court could safely find that Con-
gress had no intent to have the already existing antitrust laws forbid this type
of state action, i.e., state agricultural regulation. The Congress had already
enacted a federal Agricultural Adjustment Act which was inconsistent with the
application of the previously existing federal antitrust laws in this area, the
congressional agricultural statute was of equal dignity with the antitrust statute,
and the state agricultural action was harmonious with the federal regulation;
hence, the Supreme Court did not apply the prohibitions of the antitrust laws
to this type of state regulatory action. . . . Thus, Parker v. Brown involves
not just state governmental action; it involves regulatory action in the state's
capacity as sovereign, and it involves sovereign state regulatory action which
is consistent with federal national policy, i.e., the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
enunciated by the National Congress, which is also the source of federal anti-
trust policy.
444 F.2d at 936-37.
47. 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970).
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when government determines that competition is not the summum bonum in
a particular field and deliberately attempts to provide an alternative form of
public regulation.' ,,48
The Supreme Court has recently retreated from some of the more restric-
tive interpretations of Parker, but at the same time it has made the test of
"state action" more stringent. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,49 the Court
confronted a scheme for setting minimum attorneys' fees. Under Virginia
law, the state supreme court was given authority to promulgate rules to gov-
ern the conduct of attorneys. The statute said nothing about any specific
practices, however, and in particular was silent on the issue of pricing of serv-
ices. The state supreme court adopted ethical codes that allowed a lawyer
to consider fee schedules published by bar associations, but that also com-
manded him not to be controlled by them. The state bar, to which all at-
torneys had to belong in order to practice in Virginia, issued two reports sug-
gesting that to habitually ignore fee schedules would call for disciplinary ac-
tion. Inasmuch as the state bar was charged with the duty of investigating
and reporting violations of the supreme court's rules, those interpretations
carried a great deal of weight. In the end, however, it was not the state
bar that published the fee schedules, but the county bar association, a group
with no official status at all.
The Supreme Court dispatched the two bar associations' bids for antitrust
immunity very quickly, ruling that the state supreme court rules may have
"prompted" the anticompetitive conduct, but did not compel it. Therefore,
there was no state action and no antitrust immunity. 50 The Court did not
attempt to reconcile state law with federal antitrust policy, nor did it rely on
the absence of a federal regulatory policy in the area as ground for distin-
guishing Parker. Rather, it cut back the Parker exemption to cases where
the state commands a course of action as an exercise of its sovereign author-
ity.
The "state action" doctrine of Parker must not be confused with the power
to contravene the antitrust laws. The Parker Court carefully noted that "a
state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by au-
48. 444 F.2d at 941, quoting 424 F.2d at 30.
49. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
50. Id. at 790-91. The Court further stated:
Although the Supreme Court's ethical codes mention advisory fee schedules
they do not direct either respondent to supply them, or require the type of price
floor which arose from respondents' activities. Although the State Bar appar-
ently has been granted the power to issue ethical opinions there is no indication
in this record that the Virginia Supreme Court approves the opinions.
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thorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." 51 This
theme was elaborated in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,5 2
which dealt with the validity of a state antidiscounting statute. The statute
authorized manufacturers or distributors of a product to agree with retailers
to set minimum retail prices. It further compelled all other retailers of the
product to charge no less than the price agreed to by the parties to the mini-
mum-price contract, notwithstanding the fact that the other retailers had not
entered into any such contract themselves. The Supreme Court observed
that "the fact that a state authorized the price-fixing does not, of course, give
immunity to the scheme, absent approval by Congress. '58  While noting that
the Miller-Tydings Act 54 specifically exempted minimum price agreements
from the antitrust laws in states that had authorized them, the Court pointed
out that the Act did not cover state nonsigner statutes, and this was "fatal to
the respondents' position . . ... 55 The Court relied on the intent behind the
Sherman Act and provisions in the Miller-Tydings Act that continued the
Sherman Act's prohibitions against "horizontal" price fixing,56 and the fact
that if Congress intended to give nonsigner clauses antitrust immunity,
it would do so by specific provision.5 7 Because there was no specific provi-
sion in the Act granting such immunity, and because state and federal poli-
cies conflicted, the Court concluded that the state was impermissibly com-
pelling conduct forbidden by the Sherman Act. 58 The Court's emphasis on
51. 317 U.S. at 351.
52. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
53. Id. at 386. Price fixing has been held to be a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. See, e.g., Kieffer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
54. Pub. L. No. 75-314, Title VIII, § 1, 50 Stat. 693, amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1937).
55. 341 U.S. at 388. The Court emphasized that the Act did not "turn over to the
states the whole problem of resale price maintenance ...... but only those areas spe-
cifically included in the legislation. Id.
56. Id. at 389.
57. Id. at 390. In making this assessment of the legislative intent, the Court cited
previous minimum price legislation and congressional debate on the Miller-Tydings Act.
Id. at 390-95.
58. Id. It is lawful for a distributor to negotiate "vertical" price agreements with
each of his retailers and thereby lawfully eliminate price competition so long as no coer-
cion whatsoever is used. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); cf.
Dart Drug Corp. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 221 F. Supp. 948 (D.D.C. 1963), afi'd, 344
F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
However when retailers are forced to abandon price competition, they are
driven into a compact in violation of the spirit of the proviso which forbids
"horizontal" price fixing. A real sanction can be given the prohibitions of the
proviso only if the price maintenance power granted a distributor is limited to
voluntary engagements.
341 U.S. at 389.
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the state's coercion seems, at first glance, to stand Parker on its head. After
all, it was only because the state compelled the nonsigners to adhere to the
minimum price that "they [were] driven into a compact."59 Furthermore,
it is the enforcement of the state law that the Court declines to undertake.
One way out of this thicket would have been to adopt a theory similar
to that chosen in Woods, by confining Parker to cases where federal and
state regulatory policies (including antitrust policies) worked together. In
Schwegmann Bros., as the Court pointed out, the state nonsigner clause con-
flicted with federal policy, so the Court could have distinguished Parker on
that basis. It chose not to do so, but instead distinguished Parker with the
observation that the conduct at issue was not state action but private ac-
tion which was forbidden by the Sherman Act.60 The Court expanded upon
this evaluation of the circumstances by implying that the state acted only as
the instrument of the parties entering into the minimum price agreement. As
such they could
fix minimum prices pursuant to their contract or agreement with
impunity. When they seek, however, to impose price fixing on per-
sons who have not contracted or agreed to the scheme, . . . [t]hat
is not price fixing by contract or agreement; that is price fixing by
compulsion. That is not following the path of consensual agree-
ment; that is resort to coercion. 61
In other words, the Schwegmann Court regarded the state's involvement as
the enforcer of the statute to be insufficient to call into play the state action
doctrine of Parker. The private parties were free to adopt or forego their
remedy in court. The terms to be enforced by the court were those agreed
to by the private parties in their price fixing agreements with one another.
The state acted throughout as a purely passive entity whose sole task was
to enforce private actions. It never undertook the task, mentioned in both
Parker and Georgia Power, of reviewing the terms of the agreements with
a view to accepting, rejecting or modifying them.
These three major limitations on Parker (the insistence on a high level of
state involvement in the actual operations of a program; the still nascent
trend to construe Parker as concerned with parallel federal and state actions,
not conflicting ones; and the inability of states to authorize private parties
to escape antitrust penalties) combine to make compulsory sharing laws rela-
.59. 341 U.S. at 389.
60. By classifying the minimum retail price scheme as private action, the Court
brought Schwegmann Bros. in line with Parker, which had held that if the program was
operated by force of individual agreement, as it was in Schwegmann Bros., it violated
the Sherman Act. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 35Q:
61, 341 U.S. at 38.
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tively ineffective as protectors of large EFT projects. They do not entail ex-
tensive regulatory oversight at the time that the parties enter into a sharing
arrangement. They do not compel anyone to accept any particular system's
offer. They do not specify the number of systems to be offered, the services
to be offered over them, or the terms on which they are to be offered. They
do not match any well-established federal policy other than the antitrust
laws, 62 and they can be made to match the antitrust laws only by sharply
curtailing their scope. Where they conflict with the antitrust laws, they must
give way.
III. CONCLUSION
It is obvious that acceptable, effective EFT legislation will be a problem
because of existing antitrust restraints. The first line of order should be com-
prehensive federal legislation, similar to that in Parker, which specifically de-
lineates EFT systems' immunity to antitrust regulations. Based on this fed-
eral policy, state legislation, consistent with Parker and subsequent cases,
must be enacted to control the growth of EFTS. Whether the federal legis-
lation should include provisions that compel institutions to use EFT services
is a matter that must be decided. Without such provisions it could be argued
that EFT systems will never become an effective and viable alternative to
traditional systems, yet with them come the possible evils of product stand-
ardization and uniform pricing. Another issue for resolution is whether all
financial institutions or only institutions in specific financial categories (e.g.,
commercial banks and savings and loan associations) should have access to
EFT services. One fact is certain: EFT legislation must be forthcoming be-
fore EFT policy becomes a disorganized mass of inconsistencies incapable of
being fashioned into a unified policy.
62. Congress has created a National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers and
charged it with the duty of creating such a policy. See 12 U.S.C. & 2401 (Supp. V,
1975).
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